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Jak polskie sądy stosują wcześniejsze orzeczenia?
SUMMARY
In this article, the authors analyse the manners of applying prior rulings in the process of law 
enforcement by the Polish courts. Three aspects of this issue are examined in sequence. Firstly, the 
manner of referring to rulings (e.g., quote, paraphrase, etc.). Secondly, situations, in which courts refer 
to other rulings (e.g., as a reference point, as an evidence of interpretative doubts, as a tool removing 
vagueness or ambiguity of a provision, as a methodological tip, as a legal basis of a ruling, etc.). 
Thirdly, the reasons for those acts of reference to appear. In conclusions, the authors juxtapose the 
analysis results with the practice of referring to judicial rulings, which is characteristic for countries 
applying the precedential law, and they also indicate basic differences between them.
Keywords: case law; argumentation; precedent
INTRODUCTION
There are few things more fascinating for a legal theorist from a statutory law 
country than the idea of judge-made law. It contradicts the very foundation of our 
understanding of what law is, as well as what it can and should be1. At the same 
time, we all know that somehow it works. Even more, it is to some extent exercised 
in continental Europe, both by national courts (e.g., in Scandinavian countries) 
1  Namely the distinction between making law and applying it, see: M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedens 
a tzw. decyzja prawotwórcza, „Państwo i Prawo” 1980, z. 6, p. 78.
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and – recently – by the European Court of Justice, whose case law is steadily pen-
etrating national legal systems2. Thus, in statutory law countries, a lot of scientific 
attention has been paid to the Anglo-Saxon doctrine of precedent, as the root of the 
judge-made law phenomenon. There is a vivid, ongoing debate about the potential 
of precedent for the statutory legal order3.
In Poland, there is a general esteem for precedent as a basis for the judicial 
application of law4. It is often viewed as a remedy for poor quality legislation and 
unreflective, mechanical adjudication. Different authors have disagreed, however, 
on whether and how it could be implemented into the Polish legal order5. Some 
claim that we already live in a system of precedents6, although it may be a trivi-
alised or false version of precedents7. Others are more sceptical and underline the 
significant, profound differences between common law and civil law systems, i.e., 
the different forms of reasoning8.
The task we have undertaken in this article can be viewed as a deliberate 
step back in order to provide some necessary background. We do not ask here 
about the potential of precedent in the statutory legal order, or to what extent the 
decisions of statutory law courts are precedents9. In fact, we will not even use the 
term “precedent”, in order to avoid any confusion10. Instead, our contribution to 
the debate will be an analysis of the actual ways in which Polish courts refer to 
earlier judicial decisions in the process of applying law. It is mostly a descriptive, 
soft-empirical study aimed at grasping the existing judicial practice. Hopefully, it 
can provide a more solid foundation for future studies and theoretical propositions 
in this field.
2  M. Koszowski, Anglosaska doktryna precedensu. Porównanie z polską praktyką orzeczniczą, 
Warszawa 2009, pp. 145–147.
3  See, e.g.: Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study, eds. D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Sum-
mers, Dartmouth 1997; Precedens w polskim systemie prawa, red. A. Śledzińska-Simon, M. Wyrzy-
kowski, Warszawa 2010; other articles in this volume.
4  T. Stawecki, Precedens w polskim porządku prawnym. Pojęcie i wnioski de lege ferenda, [in:] 
Precedens w polskim systemie…, pp. 96–98.
5  Tomasz Stawecki, in his very informative article, distinguishes four attitudes towards prece-
dents in Polish legal theory: traditional, skeptical, pragmatic and radical. See: ibidem, pp. 71–73.
6  L. Morawski, Precedens a wykładnia, „Państwo i Prawo” 1996, z. 10, pp. 3–5.
7  E. Łętowska, Czy w Polsce możemy mówić o prawie precedensowym, [in:] Precedens w pol-
skim systemie…, p. 13; J. Zajadło, Precedens rzeczywisty i pozorny, czyli po co prawnikom filozofia 
prawa, [in:] Precedens w polskim systemie…, p. 25.
8  T. Stawecki, Precedens w polskim porządku prawnym…, pp. 71–73; idem, Precedens jako za-
danie dla nauk prawnych, [in:] Precedens w polskim systemie…, pp. 228–265; M. Koszowski, op. cit., 
pp. 115–143.
9  See, e.g.: L. Morawski, Precedens a wykładnia, pp. 10–12.
10  It should be noted that it is an extremely polysemic term, both in common law and civil law 
environments. See: M. Koszowski, op. cit., pp. 108–109; M. Zirk-Sadowski, op. cit., pp. 70–73.
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We have to begin by making several caveats to outline the context of our 
research. First of all, Poland is a statutory law country and we dare to say – quite 
a typical one. Therefore, in our research, Poland serves as a proxy for most civil 
law countries and we claim that our findings have quite a universal appeal11. Courts 
in Poland are supposed to apply law and not to create it. According to the Polish 
Constitution, their decisions are not a source of law. Thus, they are not formally 
binding and they cannot act as a legal basis for later judicial decisions. There are 
a few exceptions to this general rule, but they are limited to particular courts and 
particular cases, like a legal opinion (e.g., the interpretation of the rule at hand) of 
the appellate court being binding on a lower court whose decision it overruled. We 
will not discuss these issues because of their procedural nature.
All this is not to say that earlier judicial decisions have no impact on the judi-
ciary. Of course, it is methodologically problematic to analyse their actual heuris-
tic impact on judges and their decision-making (i.e., psychological motivations). 
Such an analysis would require employing serious psychological or sociological 
machinery, which is something we never intended to do. Neither are we interested 
in a logical reconstruction of the process of judicial decision-making12. The im-
portant fact is that Polish courts tend to quote earlier judicial decisions more often 
than not. Therefore, we are interested in the content of written judicial opinions, 
where courts present justification of their decisions13. It is the argumentation used 
in these opinions that we aim to investigate in this paper14.
Lawrence Solan claims that quoting other courts’ decisions is a trait of common 
law judges: “American judges are unrelenting in their citation of earlier decisions 
as a reason to construe a statute one way or the other. Civil law judges are gener-
ally not wedded to this approach”15. As much as we admire his academic work, we 
find this particular statement to be misleading at best. Civil law judges cite each 
other extensively16. We have conducted a little empirical research in order to ver-
ify this thesis. It involved the last 50 judgments of several types of Polish courts: 
11  The content of several chapters of the book Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study, eds. 
D.N. MacCormick, R. Summers, Dartmouth 1991, seems to prove this presumption.
12  See: M. Zirk-Sadowski, op. cit., pp. 69–78; L. Leszczyński, Precedens jako źródło rekonstruk-
cji normatywnej podstawy decyzji stosowania prawa, [in:] Prawo a wartości. Księga jubileuszowa 
Profesora Józefa Nowackiego, Kraków 2003, pp. 149–162.
13  See: J. Wróblewski, Precedens i jednolitość sądowego stosowania prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 
1971, z. 10, pp. 529–531; L. Leszczyński, op. cit., p. 155.
14  See also: Z. Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick, R. Summers, J. Wróblewski, On Method and 
Methodology, [in:] Interpreting Statutes…, pp. 16–18.
15  L.M. Solan, Precedent in statutory interpretation, “North Carolina Law Review” 2016, 
Vol. 94, p. 1169.
16  It appears that this attitude is not restricted to Poland, but shared by courts in many other civil 
law countries, including Argentina, Germany, Finland and Italy, see the respective chapters in: Inter-
preting Statutes… See also: R. Summers, M. Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis, [in:] 
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Supreme Court, Administrative Supreme Court, Appellate Courts and Regional 
Administrative Courts. We excluded lower courts’ decisions because they are badly 
underrepresented in legal databases, and therefore their sample would be highly 
unrepresentative. Next, we calculated how many of the selected decisions include at 
least one citation of another judicial decision. The numbers are as follow: 66% for 
the Supreme Court, 75% for the Administrative Supreme Court, 78% for Appellate 
Courts and 81% for Regional Administrative Courts.
The above results make it legitimate to say that Polish courts (at least the higher 
courts) typically refer to earlier decisions. It also shows that – unsurprisingly – this 
tendency is stronger in lower courts and weaker in the highest ones, which are right-
ly expected to be more self-contained. Another interesting aspect is the differentia-
tion between common and administrative courts, namely courts that, among other 
things, review decisions of administration bodies (i.e., imposing taxes, granting 
licences, etc.). It seems that administrative courts are more prone to quoting other 
decisions. This can be explained by the fact that this branch of the judiciary deals 
mostly with purely legal – as opposed to factual – issues. Therefore, it is much more 
focused on interpretive problems and – consequently – more involved in theoretical 
debates, which includes quoting and discussing others’ opinions.
In this article, we would like to ask three questions concerning the use of earlier 
judicial decisions by Polish courts as well as offering some preliminary answers. 
First, how do courts refer to other judicial decisions? Second, when do they do it? 
And third, why do they do it, and is this frequent tendency justified?
THE “HOW”
The “how” question includes the form of a quotation and it has several in-
teresting aspects to it. First, a court can refer to one or more judicial decisions. 
Sometimes the reference is indefinite – a court simply asserts that this or that view 
has been previously expressed by the judiciary (sometimes this reference is dubbed 
“line of judgment”)17. This is, of course, controversial, because a party is usually 
left with no clue as to where the reference could be found. A second aspect is the 
technical manner of making the reference. Sometimes courts will offer a word for 
word quotation from another decision, either using parenthesis or not. More often 
though, a court would rather paraphrase an excerpt from another court’s decision. 
Interpreting Statutes…, pp. 487–488. According to those authors: “Together with the statute applied 
in order to decide the case, precedents are the most frequently used materials in judicial opinions”.
17  See, e.g., postanowienie SN z dnia 24 stycznia 2007 r., II KK 267/06. See also: K. Grot-
kowska, Problematyka argumentu z linii orzeczniczej, [in:] Refleksyjność w prawie. Inspiracje, red. 
J. Karczewski, M. Żuralska, Warszawa 2015, pp. 53–66.
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This leads to the question: how close is the paraphrase to the original. It is very easy 
for a referring court to omit a vital passage, either intentionally or accidentally18. 
Sometimes a court will neither quote nor paraphrase, but simply note that there is 
a judicial decision that supports its opinion. In this case, the decision acts similarly 
to a footnote in a scientific article. Third, a quotation may occur either before19 or 
after the court’s own argumentation20, or it may substitute it entirely. Yet another 
interesting aspect of the “how” question refers to the difference between an opinion 
and a dissent (or votum separatum). It is not unlikely for a court to quote a dissent 
from other judicial decisions21. This raises important questions about the reasons 
for the quotation, which will be discussed below.
THE “WHEN”
Earlier judicial decisions are used in a number of different situations. Due to 
the enormous amount of empirical data, it is virtually impossible to analyse, or 
even identify, all of them. Here we will discuss only those that appear to be either 
the most common, according to our research, or the most theoretically interesting. 
This list, however, should be treated as a rough typology, not a rigid classification.
1. As a starting point
In some instances, an earlier decision may act as a starting point. It means that 
a court refers to it to set the scene for the actual argumentation. For example, a court 
may refer to a judicial opinion where some preliminary problem was discussed22. It 
is non-controversial in this particular case, but such a quotation shows the court’s 
18  For example: the Supreme Court decided a case on a provision introducing “a non-categoric 
tenancy option”, stating that local administration is not obliged by such a provision (uchwała SN 
z dnia 25 czerwca 2008 r., III CZP 37/08). That decision was later quoted by a lower court as a crucial 
argument in a case in which a tenancy was guaranteed by the provision, and the adjective “non-cat-
egoric” was simply omitted.
19  For example: “The legal issue that caused the dispute being the essence of the case, was 
already a subject of recognition by Administrative Supreme Court in cases that led to the following 
decisions […]”. Wyrok NSA w Warszawie z dnia 27 kwietnia 2017 r., II FSK 896/15.
20  For example: “A similar view has already been expressed in Administrative Supreme Court’s 
decisions […]”. Wyrok NSA w Warszawie z dnia 25 kwietnia 2017 r., II FSK 207/16.
21  For example: uchwała SN w pełnym składzie z dnia 28 stycznia 2014 r.; wyrok SN z dnia 
25 września 2008 r., II PK 40/08. See also: Z. Tobor, Spór o zdania odrębne, [in:] Wielowymiarowość 
prawa, Toruń 2014, pp. 215–229.
22  For example, a court may note that a certain regulation has an exceptional character (see: 
postanowienie SN z dnia 27 kwietnia 2017 r., IV KO 37/17; postanowienie SN z dnia 5 grudnia 2012 r., 
III KO 102/12, LEX nr 1231575).
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erudition, delineates the current state of legal discourse and acts as a warm-up 
before the real problem is discussed. Usually, it also limits the area of controversy 
– a court shows that some problems have already been clarified and need no more 
scrutinising. Instead, a court may now give its full attention to the issue at hand. 
We suppose it corresponds with a natural human tendency to deal first with the 
things we know how to deal with, and only then get down to the things that are 
truly problematic.
2. As a proof of doubt
Another situation is using an earlier decision as a proof of doubt – evidence 
that a certain regulation is indeed controversial23. In some cases, the discrepancy 
of legal views is a formal prerequisite for applying certain legal institutions, e.g. 
– in case of the Supreme Court – accepting a cassation complaint24 or assembling 
a larger bench25. Most of the time, however, it simply justifies giving more attention 
to the problem at hand, as well as making use of extraordinary interpretative tools, 
for instance denying the literal meaning of the statute26. This is important due to 
a widespread interpretive principle, expressed by the Latin maxim: Clara non sunt 
interpretanda. It states that clear rules are not to be interpreted  – they are under-
stood and simply applied. Interpretation comes into play only in case of ambiguity, 
obscurity and other problems with meaning of the rule at hand. This interpretive 
principle originates from the work of Jerzy Wróblewski. It was introduced on 
purely descriptive – as opposed to normative – grounds, and it has a subtle, prag-
matic character, often overlooked by its critics. For example, Wróblewski rightly 
acknowledges that clarity of a rule is not a mere function of its linguistic structure, 
but results from variety of factors and that the same rule can be clear in one context 
and unclear in another27. Nevertheless, the popular reading of this principle ignores 
these subtleties and asks for proof of doubt before starting an interpretation28. This 
23  “Regarding the question presented by the regional court, first and foremost one needs to 
acknowledge the discrepancy of views both in legal doctrine and in case law” (postanowienie SA 
w Łodzi z dnia 20 lipca 2011 r., II AKz 380/11; see also: uchwała NSA w Warszawie 7 sędziów 
z dnia 24 listopada 2008 r., II FPS 4/08; wyrok SA w Białymstoku z dnia 7 kwietnia 2016 r., III AUa 
1164/15; wyrok SA w Katowicach z dnia 3 lutego 2011 r., II AKa 476/10).
24  Art. 3989 k.p.c., see: postanowienie SN z dnia 23 kwietnia 2015 r., I CSK 691/14.
25  Art. 60 ust. 1 ustawy z dnia 23 listopada 2002 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym.
26  For example: wyrok NSA w Warszawie z dnia 4 lutego 2015 r., I OSK 1248/13; wyrok WSA 
w Olsztynie z dnia 12 września 2013 r., I SA/Ol 370/13.
27  See: J. Wróblewski, Pragmatyczna jasność prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1988, z. 4; A. Gra-
bowski, Clara non sunt interpretanda vs. omnia sunt interpretanda. A never-ending controversy in 
Polish legal theory?, “Revus” 2015, Vol. 27; K. Płeszka, Wykładnia rozszerzająca, Warszawa 2010, 
pp. 187–235.
28  For example: wyrok SN z dnia 16 maja 2003 r., II KK 65/03.
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is where the discussed way of using earlier decisions is especially useful, as there is 
no better proof of legal controversy than a disagreement in the judiciary resulting 
in two or more contradictory decisions29.
3. As a methodological guide
Earlier decisions are also used as a methodological guides. A court would often 
refer to other decisions in order to justify applying a certain method of interpreta-
tion. In Poland, the biggest controversy in this respect is the arguable primacy of 
“linguistic interpretation”. According to the proponents of this principle, linguistic 
interpretation (i.e., the analysis of the meaning of words and grammar used in 
a provision, as well as using some formal logic reasoning) is what any interpretive 
activity should always begin with. Only if this method proves insufficient, open-
ing the door to further investigations, is a court allowed to refer to extra-linguistic 
factors, be they contextual, systematic, historical, functional or purposive30. The 
opposing principle states that a court should always make use of all available 
interpretive tools because it is the only way to guarantee the proper results of an 
interpretation. Constraining courts to a purely linguistic method is often misleading 
and renounces a lot of relevant factors31. Choosing an interpretive methodology is, 
therefore, a crucial decision. Not surprisingly, courts often refer to the authority of 
other courts to justify their choice. The same applies to the methodologies of eval-
uating evidence. For lower courts, which are more likely to deal with evidentiary, 
rather than interpretive, problems, this choice is even more important. For example, 
there are two competing lines of judgment concerning the problem of ascribing an 
intention to kill in Polish criminal law. According to one, it can be inferred simply 
from the use of a dangerous tool, according to another – it cannot. As usual, it is 
up to the court to choose between them.
29  For example: “Legal practice experiences indeterminacy (vagueness) of the notion of […], 
and it is proved by numerous statements by legal doctrine and rich case law of administrative courts 
devoted to this issue”. Wyrok WSA w Olsztynie z dnia 4 grudnia 2012 r., II SAB/Ol 160/12.
30  See: L. Morawski, Zasady wykładni prawa, Toruń 2010, p. 72. As the Supreme Court pointed: 
“[…] the most important interpretive directive of preferences is, widely accepted by the judiciary and 
legal doctrine, the principle of linguistic interpretation primacy and the subsidiary use of systematic 
and functional interpretation. This principle, though not absolute, allows for different methods of 
interpretation only when the result of linguistic interpretation is absurd, iniquitous or leads to irrational 
consequences”. Uchwała SN z dnia 12 stycznia 2010 r., III CZP 119/09.
31  See: A. Bielska-Brodziak, Interpretacja tekstu prawnego na przykładzie orzecznictwa podat-
kowego, Warszawa 2009, pp. 197–208; M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, reguły, wskazówki, 
Warszawa 2002, p. 275. “In the process of interpreting law, one cannot ignore the systematic or func-
tional interpretation and restrict himself to linguistic interpretation only” – wyrok NSA w Warszawie 
z dnia 17 grudnia 2009 r., II FSK 1121/08. See also: wyrok WSA w Gdańsku z dnia 6 marca 2013 r., 
II SA/Gd 718/12; wyrok NSA w Warszawie z dnia 13 czerwca 2014 r., I FSK 838/13.
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4. As a dictionary
Very often, earlier court decisions are used as specific sort of dictionary. A court 
defines the meaning of a provision with reference to earlier decisions32. Apparently, 
this practice is common in the American judiciary as well33. This meaning is often 
called “juristic” as opposed to both “ordinary” and “legal”34. Of course, judicial de-
cisions are not dictionaries and judges are not lexicographers. Most court decisions 
are highly situational, and so is the meaning constructed for their purposes. At the 
same time, the use of statutory terms by earlier courts can be viewed, according 
to the causal theory of reference by Kripke and Putnam, as “multiple groundings” 
of their meaning. Analysing those previous uses allows an interpreter to track the 
evolution of the meaning of legal terms35.
The next two types of use can be classified as subtypes of the above-men- 
tioned one.
5. As a vagueness killer
Sometimes earlier decisions are used by courts to fight the vagueness of statu-
tory language36. It can appear in two forms: a court may refer to an earlier decision 
as proof that a given object does or does not fall into the scope of a vague expres-
sion, e.g., that a screwdriver is a “dangerous tool”37. However, such a reference 
may also be made in order to introduce more specific, extra-statutory conditions, 
making it easier for a court to classify certain objects into a given category, e.g., 
that the evaluation of whether something is “a dangerous tool” should be made 
based on objective and inherent features of that object, and not the manner of its 
use38. What is controversial here is the fact that vagueness in legal language is 
generally introduced intentionally by the legislature, in order to provide flexibility 
32  For example: wyrok SN z dnia 10 lipca 2013 r., IV KK 87/13; wyrok NSA w Warszawie 
z dnia 5 maja 2017 r., II FSK 1041/15.
33  L.M. Solan, Precedent in statutory…, p. 1186.
34  See: A. Bielska-Brodziak, op. cit., pp. 56–57; postanowienie SA w Białymstoku z dnia 
10 kwietnia 1991 r., II AKz 13/91; uchwała SN 7 sędziów z dnia 21 września 2005 r., I KZP 29/05.
35  M. Matczak, Teoria precedensu czy teoria cytowań? Uwagi o praktyce odwołań do wcze-
śniejszych orzeczeń sądowych w świetle teorii wielokrotnych ugruntowań ferenda, [in:] Precedens 
w polskim systemie…, pp. 116–122.
36  On the topic of the vagueness of legal language, see for example: T. Endicott, Vagueness in 
law, Oxford 2001; A. Marmor, Varieties of Vagueness in the Law, “University of Southern California” 
2013 (Working Paper 89); M.L. Solan, The Language of Statutes. Laws and Their Interpretation, 
Chicago–London 2010.
37  For example: postanowienie SN z dnia 1 października 2008 r., IV KK 88/08.
38  For example: wyrok SA w Katowicach z dnia 24 października 2013 r., II AKa 238/13, LEX 
nr 1400248.
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of statutory text39. Sometimes it looks like courts are trying to limit this flexibility, 
which is not necessarily their role.
6. As an ambiguity-solver
Another dictionary-like use is when a court resolves an ambiguity of statuto-
ry language. By ambiguity, we mean a situation in which there is more than one 
legitimate reading of a given provision. The source of ambiguity could either be 
lexical or syntactic. This situation differs from the previous one because ambigu-
ity is never intended by the legislature – it is rather considered a drafting error40. 
Therefore, when a court refers to an earlier decision in order to resolve ambiguity, 
i.e., to decide how the conjunctive word “AND” should be construed in a given 
sentence41, it does amend the statute42. One might argue that this is also not its role 
in the legal system, and yet firstly: such an amendment is necessary for the rule 
to be applied in any way, and secondly: it can be perfectly in line with legislative 
intent, which was simply erroneously expressed.
7. As legal rules
Courts use other decisions as legal rules when they start to analyse the text of 
the opinion as if it was law, instead of analysing the statute itself. To some extent, 
all of the ways of use mentioned above have this element to them, but sometimes 
it is particularly apparent. There is an illustrative example of such a case: in Polish 
law, there is a statute governing the procedure of political vetting called lustracja – 
candidates for public officials have to either admit or deny that they used to collab-
orate with the communist security agendas. These declarations are later verified by 
a court. The statutory definition of this collaboration is not very precise. However, 
over the years, the courts – with significant help from the Polish Constitutional 
Court – have adopted many auxiliary rules and conditions defining what conduct 
can be counted as “collaboration”. Nowadays, when recognising vetting cases, 
courts usually cite, analyse and interpret those judge-made rules and conditions, 
rather than the statute itself43. This is a civil law version of the phenomenon called 
39  See: J. Wróblewski, Statutory Interpretation in Poland, [in:] Interpreting Statutes…, pp. 262–
263; Z. Tobor, W poszukiwaniu intencji prawodawcy, Warszawa 2013, pp. 189–212.
40  See: Z. Tobor, W poszukiwaniu intencji…, pp. 179–188.
41  Wyrok SN z dnia 2 marca 2015 r., IV KK 382/14, LEX nr 1654750.
42  As Lawrence Solan puts it (quoting Justice Black): “[…] courts must resolve ambiguities 
in statutes, even when such resolution is inseparable from a policy decision that, in an ideal world, 
would have been the legislature’s to make”. L.M. Solan, Precedent…, p. 1177 (see Boys Mkts., Inc., 
398 U.S. at 256-58 [J. Black, dissenting]).
43  Wyrok SN z dnia 29 stycznia 2016 r., IV KK 326/15.
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“textualisation of precedent”, described in American jurisprudence44. It is not easy 
to evaluate this phenomenon. It can be both beneficial and detrimental for the legal 
system. It is unarguably beneficial when the courts clarify statutory language that 
way, for instance, creating necessary classifications and definitions. At the same 
time, substituting judicial language for that of the legislature creates important 
questions about the role of judiciary in a statutory law order45.
THE “WHY”
Let us now turn to the third question, the question of “why”. At this point, it 
is hardly possible to avoid comparisons with the Anglo-Saxon doctrine of judicial 
precedent. This doctrine is often described as a way of ensuring stability and co-
herence of adjudication – through the doctrine of stare decisis46. The use of prece-
dents in statutory interpretation is also based mostly on these two key values47. 
There is no doubt that these values undergird civil law culture as well, and quoting 
earlier decisions is often seen as a means of advancing them48. However, our study 
suggests that citing earlier judicial decisions by courts does not always fulfill, nor 
even correspond with, stability and coherence.
First of all, it should be stressed that in Poland (as in most civil law countries) 
there is no “statutory stare decisis”, namely a principle whereby precedents in 
statutory cases are not to be overturned lightly, known in common law countries49. 
There is no formal binding of earlier judicial decisions; they act merely as interpre-
44  See: P. Tiersma, The Textualisation of Precedent, “Notre Dame Law Review” 2006, Vol. 82, 
pp. 1187–1278. According to Lawrence Solan, it is a departure from classical common law analysis, 
in which the holding is considered to have precedential effect, but not the reasoning. See: L.M. Solan, 
Precedent…, p. 1216. Indeed, civil law judges are usually more interested in the reasoning (argumen-
tation) of other courts, not the holdings.
45  Ibidem, p. 1219.
46  See: M. Koszowski, op. cit., pp. 18–19; T. Stawecki, Precedens jako zadanie…, pp. 232–235, 239.
47  L.M. Solan, Precedent…, p. 1220. According to Lawrence Solan, there are four main reasons 
why American courts rely on statutory precedents. First and foremost, to ensure coherence in the 
application of law. Second, to demonstrate that an argument falls within the culture of legal reasoning 
and thus is entitled to some level of deference. Third, to develop principles that courts wish to follow 
so that interpretation proceeds in a path-dependent manner. Fourth, to introduce a methodological 
stare decisis. See: ibidem pp. 1185–1187. See also: R.H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” 
and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, “University of Chicago Law Review” 2015, 
Vol. 82(3), p. 1251.
48  Ibidem, p. 1175; J. Wróblewski, Precedens i jednolitość sądowego stosowania…, pp. 532–533; 
M. Zirk-Sadowski, op. cit., p. 78.
49  L.M. Solan, Precedent…, pp. 1175–1178.
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tive arguments (hence they are sometimes referred to as “persuasive precedents”50). 
Simply put: “In citing each other, judges signal to readers that »this is something 
that has been said before«. When they cite multiple cases, they are signaling, »this 
is something that has been said over and over again«”51. That is it. In addition, the 
fundamental distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta is completely un-
known52. Virtually any piece of an earlier opinion can be quoted in a later decision. 
As a result instead of the doctrine of precedents, what we have is merely a practice 
of citing judicial decisions53.
As mentioned, most of the time Polish courts are interested in the argumentation 
of another court, rather than in the decision itself54. This explains, among other 
things, why courts have no problems referring to dissenting opinions, or why they 
tend to refer to large numbers of other decisions (“lines of judgment”), whereas they 
could be content with just a single, suitable opinion55. Of course, in many cases the 
distinction here is unimportant. From a certain argumentation, a certain decision is 
directly derived56. However, this approach ignores the differences between the facts 
of the cases. It often relies on wordings stripped of the relevant context, and one 
should be very careful when considering part of the argumentation detached from 
the facts of the case. It may be obvious to a common law judge, but it is not so for 
a statutory law judge57. This practice is also very susceptible to selective citations, 
namely picking only those decisions that support the desired conclusion and over-
looking all those that do not. It is no secret that for many crucial legal regulations 
there are at least two competing “lines of judgment” (or “lines of decisions”58) and 
the choice between them is more or less arbitrary59.
50  R. Summers, M. Taruffo, op. cit., pp. 487–489; J. Zajadło, op. cit., p. 27; T. Stawecki, Pre-
cedens w polskim porządku prawnym…, p. 80.
51  L.M. Solan, Precedent…, p. 1220.
52  R. Summers, M. Taruffo, op. cit., p. 489.
53  M. Matczak, op. cit., p. 99; M. Koszowski, op. cit., pp. 129–143; T. Stawecki, Precedens 
w polskim porządku prawnym…, p. 68. See also: M. La Torre, E. Pattaro, M. Taruffo, Statutory In-
terpretation in Italy, [in:] Interpreting Statutes…, p. 228.
54  M. Matczak, op. cit., p. 117.
55  R. Summers, M. Taruffo, op. cit., p. 489; M. Koszowski, op. cit., pp. 139–140.
56  Z. Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick, R. Summers, J. Wróblewski, op. cit., pp. 16–17.
57  M. Koszowski, op. cit., pp. 118–119; E. Łętowska, op. cit., p. 13; T. Stawecki, Precedens 
w polskim porządku prawnym…, pp. 67–68.
58  J. Wróblewski, Statutory Interpretation…, p. 279; M. Koszowski, op. cit., p. 139 (noting 
that “line of judgment” should not be mistaken for the term “leading case”, though there are some 
similarities between their meanings).
59  See: R. Summers, M. Taruffo, op. cit., p. 489; M. Koszowski, op. cit., p. 140. “[…] if legislative 
history comes from choosing friends at a cocktail party, citation of case precedent comes from a president 
choosing among friends at an inaugural ball” – L.M. Solan, Precedent…, p. 1169, footnote 13.
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CONCLUSIONS
Just as with all interpretive tools – quoting other decisions can be employed 
for many various tasks. In the end, it is the responsibility of judges to use it in such 
a way as to ensure further stability and coherence60. They should always keep in 
mind that it can also achieve different values, not necessarily desirable in the realm 
of statutory law61.
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STRESZCZENIE
W niniejszym artykule autorzy analizują sposoby wykorzystania wcześniejszych orzeczeń w pro-
cesie stosowania prawa przez polskie sądy. Rozważają kolejno trzy aspekty tego zagadnienia. Po 
pierwsze, sposób, w jaki orzeczenia są powoływane (np. cytat, parafraza itd.). Po drugie, sytuacje, 
w których sądy odwołują się do innych orzeczeń (np. jako punkt wyjścia, jako dowód wątpliwości 
interpretacyjnych, jako narzędzie usuwające nieostrość czy wieloznaczność przepisu, jako wskazówka 
metodologiczna, jako podstawa prawna orzeczenia itd.). Po trzecie, powody, dla których odwołania 
te się pojawiają. We wnioskach autorzy zestawiają wyniki analizy z praktyką powoływania orzeczeń 
sądowych charakterystyczną dla krajów prawa precedensowego i wskazują na podstawowe różnice.
Słowa kluczowe: orzecznictwo; argumentacja; precedens
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